Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Conference

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Abstracts

Adams, Sarah LaChance (University of Oregon) (Session A)

"The 'Good Failure' of Mothers in the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir"

Beauvoir finds that our ethical life is full of insoluble contradictions. Neither the meaning of our existence, nor our ethical standing is assured at any moment. We depend on others to help us establish our freedom, but cannot count on their generosity or collaboration. Likewise, we find that it is not always possible to care for others or to liberate them completely. Beauvoir describes how motherhood amplifies the ambiguities of ethical life and leads to an attitude of ambivalence toward one's children. However, she also provides a manner of understanding this ambivalence and ethical failure in a positive light.

Alessandri, Mariana (University of Texas, Pan American) (Session B)

"The Healing Power of Borders"

Day after day, my being a New-Yorkan Chilena in a world of Chicanos and Chicanas in the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas has provided me with fodder for philosophical analysis. This paper attempts to re-conceive the Border in light of my own experiences living on the Border. I contrast my first impressions of the Border to Gloria Anzaldúa's descriptions of it, in order to highlight the difference between growing up as a Chicana on the Border, and entering the Borderlands as a Latina from the Northeast. In contrast to Anzaldúa's images of the Border as "dividing line" and "open wound," I find that this Border unites my divided identities, and is healing my existential wounds. In light of my positive experiences, I suggest that it would be fitting to infuse the concept of Borders with positive characteristics, to give the concept body, and to philosophically theorize the potential of Borders as healers as well as destroyers.

Bardwell-Jones, Celia T. (Towson University) (Session Q)

"'Home-Making' and 'World-Traveling' in Feminist Politics: Conceiving the Borderlands in Transnational Feminist Communities"

In this essay, I examine the theoretical space-between, in feminist theory through the lens of a metaphysics of belonging framed by notions of travel and home. Feminist theory has a history of examining the fundamental nature of the space between in thinking about categories

of "woman" and strategies for coalitional politics. One of the main theoretical contributions in thinking about the space-between is María Lugones' notion of "world-traveling," which addresses the problems of exclusion in feminist coalitional politics. In this essay, I show how "world-traveling" is associated with a correlate concept of "home-making" as theorized by Yen Li Espiritu's work surrounding the lives of Filipino Americans. This interpretation, I hope, will reveal how transnational feminist theory revives this notion of home, as a process, in their understanding of world-traveling and thus provides an important contribution in addressing the state of feminist coalitional politics.

Barnette, Kara (University of Oregon/Gustavus Adolphus College) (Session Q)

"Interpreting the View from Below: Epistemic Privilege, Error Sensitivity, and Interracial Rape"

Feminist theorists such as Sandra Harding, Patricia Hill Collins, and Lorraine Code have argued that women, men of color, and members of LGBTQ communities share an epistemic privilege that allows them to better access to knowledge concerning existing power structures. However, a challenge arises with sexual assault cases involving two people of different epistemological privileges, such as a case involving a white female alleged victim and African-American male alleged perpetrator. In these situations both sides' testimonies will be clouded in the US criminal justice system by deeply ingrained stereotypes stemming from both patriarchy and racism. In situations such as these, where different axes of epistemic privilege exist I argue feminist epistemology needs an account of error sensitivity. Drawing partly on the late work of Josiah Royce, I argue that error sensitivity in these situations can be achieved when communally situated inquiry aims towards a goal of an ultimately inclusive community of interpretation.

Bhandary, Asha Leena (University of Connecticut) (Session F)

"Freedom to Care"

Contemporary political theory should begin with a conception of political persons as embodied beings who need to receive care in order to survive, function and flourish. A subset of care is "dependency care," which is the direct care that must be provided by another person so that the dependent person can function – the absence of which leads to serious harm to the dependent person. There is an asymmetry to care, though, which is that all humans need to receive care, but not all humans need to provide care. I argue that this asymmetry must be addressed in the benefits and burdens of social cooperation to be included in a theory of distributive justice. Consequently, I develop and evaluate four principles of distributive justice for dependency care: (1) Equal distribution by individual, (2) Equal distribution by gender, (3) Care-giving as the product of autonomous choice, and (4) Adequate support for care-givers. I endorse principle (3) and develop its substantive requirements, which include changes to the existing context of choice for dependency care. In addition to institutional options and incentives, the context of choice should include individuals' skills and abilities. Care-giving skills are differentially developed in women and underdeveloped in men. This must be remedied through interventional efforts to teach boys and men general care-giving skills of *attentiveness* and *responsiveness*.

Bretz, Thomas (Loyola University, Chicago) (Session O)

"The Untamable Other: What the Limits of the Human Tell Us about the Limits of Moral Theory"

I suggest that the emphasis that feminist ethics puts on the crucial role that social and emotional bonds play in our interactions with animals not only enhances theoretical accounts of those interactions, but that it also points to the inherent limits of moral theory in this regard. I begin by looking at Eva Kittay's reaction to the (utilitarian) suggestion that some mentally disabled people are on a moral par with certain animals. She strongly rejects this conclusion based on a feminist-inspired account that highly values personal relationships. Lori Gruen criticizes Kittay's account and takes a stronger animal equality stance – and she does so without losing sight of the relevance of emotional and social bonds. Against the backdrop of these conflicting positions I claim that both positions cannot be fully universalized, and that while Kittay's arguments to support her position can be criticized the basic intuition underlying it cannot. These claims I buttress with reference to Margaret Walker's account of morality and ethics as well as Cora Diamond's thoughts on the relationship between humans and animals. The former stresses the inextricable intertwinement of our lives' moral and social aspects as well as the perspectival character of our moral views. The latter develops the idea of animals as inherently open to different imaginative responses. Animals then will always both demand that we take a stance towards them, but at the same time deny us the possibility of reaching full agreement on what this stance ought to be.

Burke, Megan B. (University of Oregon) (Session A)

"Beauvoir's Phenomenology of Lesbian Existence"

Given the limited and negative attention that has been paid Simone de Beauvoir's account of lesbianism in *The Second Sex,* this paper reconsiders Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy of lesbian experience in the chapter "The Lesbian." In this paper, I read the foundational and uncontested criticisms of Beauvoir's "The Lesbian" offered by Claudia Card and Ann Ferguson as a means to open up an alternative interpretation of Beauvoir's work. I suggest Card and Ferguson significantly misconstrue Beauvoir's understanding of lesbian experience in their failure to situate the notions of *choice* and *lesbian attitudes* in the existential-phenomenological tradition. In doing so, their interpretations do an injustice to Beauvoir's philosophical insights on lesbian experience. Ultimately, through my critique of Card and Ferguson, I suggest Beauvoir offers a phenomenology of lesbian existence that is a liberatory and novel for our times.

Cahill, Ann (Elon University) (Session N)

"The Difference Sameness Makes: Objectification, Sex Work, and Queerness"

With its implicit vilification of materiality, the notion of objectification has failed to produce a coherent and effective ethical analysis of heterosexual sex work. The concept of derivatization, grounded in an Irigarian model of embodied intersubjectivity, is more effective. However, queer sex work poses new and different ethical challenges. This paper argues that although queer sex work entails both objectification and derivatization, the former is not ethically objectionable, and the latter, while the cause for some justified ethical concern, may be the necessary outcome of a culture that does not support a wide range of sexual identities.

Cooklin, Katherine (Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania) (Session R)

"Julia Kristeva on Abjection and Fascism"

Julia Kristeva's work on the abjection of the feminine is well known. Kristeva is quick to admit that actual women are not the only objects of abjection. However, given the cultural association of the maternal with the feminine, we might expect that those made abject are in some sense feminized. This does become evident in Kristeva's analysis of the Jew, another figure that has historically occupied the position of the abject. In her analysis of the misogynistic and anti-Semitic writings of Celine, Kristeva extends her theory of abjection to the issue of fascism. The mechanism of abjection as protection from the undifferentiated maternal ground of identity is operative, but so too is a "rage against" the symbolic. Thus fascism is both an attempt to exceed the symbolic and a repressive defilement. In what follows, I will argue that Kristeva's analysis of Celine's Nazi literature and fascism point to a crisis of identity, wherein subjects are not able to recognize the difference within, and to live as subjects in-process. In the mechanisms of fascism, the rage against the symbolic and the ambivalent relation to abjection there is a failure of productive negativity within the subject. This failure of productive negativity within the subject is also manifest in the body politic.

Curtis, Annaleigh E. (University of Colorado, Boulder) (Session J)

"Just Interpretation: Feminist Standpoint Theory and Experimental Philosophy"

This is a paper about the methodology used in ethics. Recent empirical work suggests that philosophical intuitions differ across sex, class, and race lines. In this paper I argue that philosophers ought to use feminist standpoint theory (FST) to interpret experimental data on intuitions and that this data also provides confirming evidence for FST. In the first section of this paper I present a brief account of how intuitions are used in philosophy. In the second section I offer a description of some of the experimental data on intuitions. In the third and fourth sections I give an account of what FST is before going on to argue that FST gives philosophers a desirable and felicitous way to interpret the experimental data and that the data gives independent support for FST.

Denike, Margaret (Dalhousie University) (Session I)

"Homonationalism and the Future of Identity Politics"

This paper provides a cursory sketch of recent developments in queer theory, attending to the convergence of GLBT human rights advocacy and normative and/or nationalist and standpoints or approaches. Drawing on Jasbir Puar and Lisa Duggan's critical paradigms of 'homonationalism' and 'homonormativity,' respectively, I provide a few illustrations of what Puar calls the "collusion" of GLBT rights campaigns and nationalist, racist, and particularly Islamophobic, sentiments (i.e. 'homonationalism'). Addressing Puar's suggestion that we move beyond identity politics and their representational frameworks to avoid the race-thinking that informs them, I raise questions concerning the potential impact of such critical analyses on human rights and equality advocacy for women and sexual minorities.

Fatima, Saba (Binghamton University) (Session Q)

"Muslim Scripts"

Political theory ought to address the disconnect that we, Muslim Americans, have with the American political scene, despite being equal citizens under law. This disconnect is a manifestation of our location within the parameters of American citizenship that is contingent on aligning oneself along political rhetoric and global coalitions. The expectation and experiences of exclusion, of knowing that one is on the margins of the criteria of a 'true' American, has served as an effective tool to limit our participation in American politics to spheres where we best conform to our stereotypes.

In this paper I argue that one of the most valuable insights that Muslim Americans ought to bring to the political arena is our affective response to the government of United States' internal and foreign policy regarding Muslims. The scope of our epistemic privilege is not derived from the comprehensive doctrine we believe in, rather it encompasses the affective response that one possesses in virtue of our propinquity to Muslims around the world and the narratives they offer. Such an affective response is crucial to our participation being meaningful, and our self remaining multiplicious, whole. Our affective response is rooted in our social location within the geo-political hierarchy, but the response or the location it is rooted in is not static, rather its meaning is negotiated and redefined by us as active agents, allowing us to bring the complexity of our identity in broad view.

Gosselin, Abigail E. (Regis University) (Session H)

"The Epistemic Function of Narratives and the Globalization of Mental Disorders"

As American standards for categorizing mental disorder are being exported throughout the world, questions must be raised about whether this globalization of the interpretation of human experience is neo-imperialistic, and how we should assess the shifts from local knowledge systems to a global scientific narrative. The American *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, which codifies mental disorders and their criteria, is situated within the scientific narrative, which has a hegemonic force that trumps local understandings of human experiences like suffering, with potentially oppressive and imperialistic effects. As the use of the DSM has become more widespread across the world, local interpretations and actual experiences of mental conditions have transformed to conform to the American psychological framework.

This paper starts by looking at examples of how local understandings of human suffering were transformed when the American psychological framework was introduced. The tensions in these examples illustrate the debate between two prominent and popular models for understanding mental disorder: scientific and socio-historical. These models provide different explanations of, or narratives about, the nature of mental disorder. I evaluate the scientific narrative as it is applied globally by examining the epistemic function of narratives. I conclude that a perspectival understanding of the scientific narrative—which acknowledges both the narrative's limitations as well as its usefulness—indicates that scientific and socio-historical narratives need not be opposed to each other but in fact may provide compatible ways of understanding the nature of mental disorder.

Greene, Nathifa (Stony Brook-SUNY) (Session R)

"Habit and Inhibition: Notes on Stereotype Threat"

Stereotype threat is a negative effect on cognitive performance that has been noted in controlled experiments by social psychologists and other empirical researchers. In these experiments, students who were made aware of a stereotype that could apply to them did not perform as well on cognitive tasks as when this prompt was not given. Stereotype threat theory has been expanded to suggest that stereotypes affect academic performance in various ways. In this paper, I frame stereotype threat in terms of habit. Stereotype threat is anxiety, a kind of inhibition that compromises the necessity and value of habit. Habit is a normative precondition for learning. This paper proposes that the habit-body, a key term in Merleau-Ponty's corporeal phenomenology, is the normative function of habit. Franz Fanon uses this term in *Black Skin, White Masks* to describe the impact of stereotypes on his experience of self, showing, by contrast, that a third person sense of self is inhibiting, in contrast to first person awareness in the normative condition when the habit-body is transparent. While habits are developed through attentive self-observation, stereotype threat is excessive self-monitoring, an inhibiting variant of attention which compromises learning and hampers performance.

Haddock, Charlene (Purdue University) (Session J)

"The 'Wise Latina Woman' Standard"

This paper examines why both the Supreme Court candidates, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, backed away from their earlier claims that the experience of being a woman or a member of an ethnic or religious minority would help them reach better judicial decisions than those who did not share such experiences. Using the pragmatist philosophies of Jane Addams and John Dewey, I argue that a profound shift in the understanding of such central concepts as impartiality, experience, identity and values is required for their claims to be acceptable to the wider public and the judicial system. Judge Sotomayor, in particular, gave a cogent and effective defense of her claim, which is explained and further defended. Finally, I argue that the "wise Latina woman standard" must be widely understood and disseminated if the values of diversity are to be incorporated into our social and political lives. Unless and until the differences that shape us as persons and as a society are acknowledged and incorporated into our moral, judicial, and political judgments, unjust principles and policies, as well as social tensions, will only increase.

Hamington, Maurice (Metropolitan State College of Denver) (Session F)

"Toward a Performative Theory of Care"

Feminist care ethics can be described as postmodern in its defiance of existing categories of moral deliberation to include significance for epistemology, metaphysics and aesthetics as well as ethics. To capture the comprehensive nature of care theory, this paper suggests that it is efficacious to characterize care in terms of *performativity*. Extending the work of feminist theorists and integrating the performative philosophies of John Dewey, Judith Butler, Erika Fiscer-Lichte, and Augusto Boal, the paper explores "care-as-performance" to address the embodied and relational nature of caring. The implication of a performative theory of care is that the physicality and action entailed in care—the stylized repetition of acts, for example—has ongoing significance for who we are, what we know, and the nature of the good in an autopoetic or dynamically creative process. The paper distinguishes three forms of performance: "stage performance," "ordinary performance," and "rehearsal for ordinary

performance." Stage performance endeavors to create art in the perfection of acting, which is not the purpose of this project. However, dramaturgical attention to performative introspection and physicality can provide a great deal of insight into ordinary performance. It is the latter, ordinary daily performances of care that are the focus of this paper and as such the concern is for the impact of performance on the performer rather than on spectators. The conclusion explores the implication of care-as-performance for the transmission of ethics through moral education, a kind of "somaesthetic" rehearsal for ordinary performance.

Hanauer, Tommy (Binghamton University) (Session M)

"A Moral Understanding of Moral Repair"

This paper explores the patterns of "reparative" behavior that surround the effects of wrongdoing – e.g., acts of forgiveness, making amends, acknowledging wrongs, etc. The paper seeks to accomplish two things: (1) to enhance our understanding of those reparative practices, as victims, perpetrators, and members of a community; and (2) to show that, by enhancing our understanding, we will come to occupy a superior epistemic standpoint that will allow us to better recognize and do what is right after a wrong has already been done; to this end, I propose a criterion for the assessment of norms, which I call "interpretive transparency." The paper, then, has both a descriptive and normative agenda. Throughout, I rely on and also critique Margaret Urban Walker's *Moral Repair and Moral Understandings.*

Heyes, Cressida (University of Alberta) (Session N)

"Crossing Streams: Feminist Philosophical Know-How"

Philosophy has traditionally conducted itself propositionally, and has an ambivalent relation to "knowing-how" or "the knowingness of the body"—those habituated, embodied skills like driving or playing a sport that cannot be learned only through knowing-that. I suggest that feminist philosophers foreground know-how as a way of capturing the experience of marginalized persons and correcting its devalued status. To take know-how seriously, however, I argue that we need to make philosophy into a self-consciously physical practice that investigates the body's knowingness in feedback relation with propositional insights. In the bulk of the paper I show how this might be done via an extended, iterative consideration of Iris Young's famous example of feminine comportment in relation to phenomenal space. Reading Young's description of tentativeness in crossing a stream as also a feminist lesson in how to move differently, I examine two further readings of a contextually specific relation to space and time: Dianne Chisholm's feminist phenomenology of climbing, and moments from my own experience of doing and teaching yoga. Ultimately these examples show not that knowing-that and knowing-how have any relation of priority, but rather than they cannot be separated. From this conclusion feminist philosophy can make a new method.

Higgins, Peter (Eastern Michigan University) (Session E)

"Beyond Admission and Exclusion: What Immigration Policies are Just?"

This paper challenges what has become a common view among liberal philosophers on immigrant admissions: that affluent societies ought to adopt open-admissions policies. Open-admissions policies appear just, I argue, only when one fails to disaggregate the consequences of their adoption; they disproportionately benefit already privileged groups (those with the

means to migrate and receiving countries themselves) while disproportionately harming those who are already among the most disadvantaged (the global poor, most of whom are women and/or people of color). Invoking the principle that just immigration policies will not avoidably harm social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged, I argue that affluent societies must either (1) prioritize the admission of prospective migrants who are poor, lacking a college education, or "unskilled," to the exclusion of middle-class professionals from poor countries, or (2) directly compensate poor sending countries in proportion the number of migrants admitted and assist the same countries in their effort to tax the income earned by emigrants in the receiving country.

Hirschmann, Nancy J. (The University of Pennsylvania) (Session H)

"Gender and the Politics of Invisible Disability"

This paper explores the various ways in which disability is invisible, through circumstance, condition, the nature of disorder, epistemic frameworks, and individual choice. I consider both the gendered dimensions of invisible disability and how feminism contributes to our analysis and understanding of it. I conclude with a suggestion for deploying invisibility as a subversive strategy.

Kelly, Jamie Terence (Vassar College) (Session E)

"Immigration and Illegality: Marx on Law and Egalitarianism"

In this paper, I will draw upon Marx's analysis of property relations in terms of rights and powers in order to discuss the current situation in advanced capitalist societies regarding immigration. I claim that in order to properly understand the current situation, we must distinguish more clearly than is normally done between our stance on the legality of immigration, and on the power to immigrate. I then address how making this distinction more clearly should impact upon our thinking about contemporary egalitarianism.

Kittay, Eva Feder (Stony Brook University--SUNY) (Session F)

"The Completion of Care—With Implications for a Duty to Receive Care Graciously"

Only a few care theorists have focused on what Nodding has called "the completion of care" and what Tronto called "the reception of care. I explore the logic of care as an "achievement verb" as a way to argue for the important, but neglected idea that actions intended as care require uptake by the cared for to be care. I argue that the requirement that care been taken up and completed by the cared for results in an obligation to receive care graciously when it is offered in good faith and with the requisite competence.

Lange, Lynda (University of Toronto, Scarborough) (Session L)

"In the Company of Strangers: Relationality, Care, and Women's Migrant Carework"

This paper is part of the developing discussion about the extension of feminist ethics to questions of global gender justice. Women's migrant carework is a major transnational phenomenon of the last few decades, and since it involves the gender-determined carework of women, critical reflection on the ethic of care is warranted. This essay reflects on the possible intersection of human rights and the values of the ethic of care, especially relationality. There

is a brief outline of the issue of migrant women's carework. Possible meanings of "relationality" are discussed. This is followed by discussion of the implications of Kittay's meaning for relationality in three essays on the moral issues in migrant carework. The difficulty of determining the justice or injustice of migrant carework and the possible moral harms involved is discussed on a theme of freedom and unfreedom. Comparisons are made between migrant carework, carework by slaves, and carework by privileged mothers. The viewpoint is presented that migrant careworkers are in important ways in the company of "strangers" with respect to their work, and that fairness and individual rights are eminently relevant and critically important, in general more so than the values of relationality. It is argued that the effort to enrich the language of justice by blending in the model of the self-in-relation seems to mislead at times, and to bring a new set of problems.

Langston, Lucy (McMaster University) (Session I)

"Taking Moral Practice Seriously: Non-Ideal Theory and the Implications of Transsexual Identities"

Accounting for the range of moral issues produced by empirical accounts of oppression is one way to test moral theory to its fullest. By setting an account of moral theory in terms of an account of the lived oppression of a marginalised community, I seek to better attend to the complexities and consequences of both ideal and non-ideal forms of moral theory. According to Lisa Tessman, moral theory ought to be derived from actual moral practice as it occurs in the real (non-ideal) world in order to address the underlying structures of oppression. Viviane Namaste, a sociologist working on transsexuality, provides an empirical example with which to test Tessman's position. Namaste opposes theorising transsexuality in terms of identity, because such uncritical political engagement with identity both suppresses any analysis of the institutions and social relations that are engaged with in the everyday lives of transsexuals and fails to consider the privileged viewpoint from which such a discourse arises. I argue that Namaste and Tessman read together, have the potential to nuance and expand each other's work. Tessman argues for a distinction between "feasible" and "worthwhile" values as a means of separating long term goals for restructuring society more justly, from short term goals of making the world just in the here-and-now. Working through Namaste's discussion of transsexual healthcare provides a way to further develop this aspect of Tessman's argument, while also providing a framework for understanding and complicating Namaste's critique of 'transsexual' as part of the sex-gender system.

Lanoix, Monique (Appalachian State University) (Session F)

"Labour as Embodied Practice: The Lessons of Care Work"

This paper critically reflects on the paradigm of immaterial labour. If service labour now has a larger share of the market, my claim is that, contrary to Hardt and Negri, the emancipatory potential of this labour remains limited within post-Fordist economies. In order to make my case, I examine paid care labour, the activities performed by a worker who has a mandate to help another adult accomplish the tasks of daily living or self-care.

Because care labour comprises affective dimensions and does not produce a commodity, it appears to fit nicely into the category of immaterial labour. However, I argue that because of the corporeal dimensions of care labour, it resists an easy inclusion into this category. I

explain how the paradigm of immaterial labour serves to undermine the relational aspects of care and I put forward the notion of thick embodiment as a better way of understanding paid care labour.

Maitra, Keya (University of North Carolina at Asheville) (Session D)

"The Questions of Identity and Agency in Feminism without Borders"

The question of identity is a difficult one for feminism. While the traditional essentialist accounts of identity are suspect for their support for oppressive power structures, the postmodernist and poststructuralist alternatives run into trouble when considered as a framework for feminist politics. If the category of women is deconstructed away, then whose liberation is the goal of feminist politics? But how to answer the questions of identity and agency in feminism without borders? Chandra Mohanty coins this phrase to highlight the multiplicity of voices and viewpoints within the feminist coalition. But answering the question of agency seems to become even harder once we try to accommodate this multiplicity. Take for example the practice of veiling among certain Muslim women. As many third-world feminists have pointed out, while veiling can't simply be perceived as a location of women's oppression, it can't be perceived as a location of 'free agency' either since what is required for true feminist agency is women's ability to 'formulate choices' and not simply to make choices. In this paper I argue that this ability includes two related abilities: first, to develop a perspective of self that acknowledges and accepts its own grounding in its given intersectionalities; second, to realize that its interdependencies and interconnectivities enable a sense of continuity and solidarity that works collaboratively towards consensus without sacrificing or stifling all differences. My main argument is that feminist self-consciousness informed by Buddhist mindfulness gives us opportunities to articulate clearly and cultivate both these abilities.

Malatino, Hilary (Paine College) (Session B)

"What If It Doesn't Get Better? Suicide, Negative Affect, and the Outside of Homonormativity"

This paper takes a close look at the politics of hope extant in the *It Gets Better* video project, conceived in late 2010 as a queer youth suicide prevention effort following the rash of heavily publicized suicides of (mostly white, male) gay youth that were allegedly elicited by extensive peer-group bullying. Situating the video project as an instantiation of what Ann Cvetkovich has termed an "archive of trauma," I interrogate the unintended affective work done by this archive as it solidifies a counterpublic around queer trauma. In doing so, I pay particular attention to the homonormative tendencies implicit in the collective promise of a better future it offers. Building upon the work of German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch on anamnesis and utopia, I conclude with a call for the necessity of a radical queer utopian imaginary as a necessary correlative to promising queer youth a better future in good faith. I position this task as one that can be fruitfully taken up by feminist philosophers committed to social justice, intersectional theorizing, and issues of livability and survival.

Mann, Bonnie (University of Oregon) (Session R)

"Gender Apparatus: Torture and National Manhood in the U.S. 'War on Terror'"

Feminist outcries over the use of sex, sexuality and sexual identity in the torture of prisoners at U.S. detention sites from Guantánamo to Abu Ghraib, have understandably tended to focus on what the abuse destroys, i.e. the victim and his or her community. Here I ask what the torture produces. I argue that gender must be understood as a central circuit of a material apparatus of production, which produces justifications through the constitution of an ephemeral fantasy: that of national manhood. Since this fantasy has no ontological weight of its own, it must borrow its sense of reality from something that is, on a phenomenological level, excruciatingly real, i.e. the gender identity and sexual subjectivity of victims of torture. Using the work of Elaine Scarry, I argue that through a process of analogical substitution, the manhood of the regime produces itself through the racialized undoing of the gender identity and sexual subjectivity of the "detainees" in the war on terror.

Meyers, Diana Tietjens (Loyola University, Chicago) (Session P)

"A Conception of Empathy for Border Crossers"

I aim to provide an account empathy that is faithful to philosophical and colloquial sources and that also recommends itself in virtue of its fruitfulness for an ethics that takes social, economic, and bodily diversity seriously. I develop and defend my account in the context of Peter Goldie's valuable work on this topic (section 1). I then examine Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie Scully's critique of the claim that empathy enables you to mind-read well enough to grasp the life satisfaction enjoyed by someone whose embodiment differs significantly from your own. Against their skepticism, I urge that, when properly understood, empathy enables you to glimpse values and disvalues as another person experiences them (Section 2). Finally, I draw on Sonia Kruks's account of embodied empathy across difference to support my view (Section 3).

Mosko, Melissa (Marquette University) (Session M)

"Violence, Voice and Advocacy"

This paper develops an idea of ethical advocacy as our moral responsibility to victims of violence. While ethical advocacy is not a new theory, this paper grounds our moral responsibility for advocacy in an understanding of violence as a loss of voice. Voice is understood as a robust intersubjective and political metaphor for agency and subjectivity. If violence is a loss of voice, then the responsibility of an advocate is not just to be a voice for victims, but to cultivate the conditions under which victims may find their voice again. Three models of advocacy are reviewed here: Sally Scholz's argument for ethical advocacy, Susan Brison and Hilde Lindemann Nelson's arguments for narrative retellings, and Kelly Oliver's theory of witnessing.

O'Connor, Peg (Gustavus Adolphus College) (Session H)

"Limitations and Embodiment: Rethinking the Imperative for Mind Body Integration for Sexual Abuse Survivors"

Survivors of sexual abuse who are not disabled prior to the abuse or as a consequence of that abuse but who are not fully integrated in our mind body relationship dwell at the border of

ability and disability. Our ways of living and negotiating the world are often seen to be in need of repair so that we may restore or achieve the proper mind body relationship. In many ways, those who do not have a "properly ordered" relationship between mind and body land in a category that is different from physically disabled and mentally disabled. Those who are not integrated in mind and body are seen more as "fractured persons" and "not fully personed." From this border perspective, we can learn much about the ableist assumptions that undergird many of the therapeutic recommendations for survivors to integrate. More importantly, perhaps, we can come to see alternative mind body relationships that begin with the recognition that all people have limitations.

Parekh, Serena (University of Connecticut) (Session E)

"Defining Refugees: Border Cross, Persecution, and the Importance of a Definition"

Women who cross borders in the hopes of receiving refugee status face gender-specific obstacles to receiving it because of the way the term "refugee" is defined. In this paper I argue that both the current legal definition of a refugee and contemporary reformulations of the term by philosophers fail to adequately take into account women's experiences of persecution. More specifically, they do not take into account the specific way that women are usually situated within society and consequently that they do not experience or respond to state persecution in the same way as men. I argue that a just understanding of the concept of a refugee must include an understanding of *structural injustice.* While an analysis of structural injustice has been a part of feminist analysis of domestic injustice and oppression for a long time, this analysis has not been extended to the international sphere. I argue below that it is crucial to do this in order to understand the specific injustices that women refugees experience and is essential to overcoming the bias against women contained in the definition of a refugee.

Park, Shelley (University of Central Florida) (Session C)

"Monomaternalism and the Politics of Mothering in Adoptive, Queer, and Blended Families"

In this essay, I explore the ideology of monomaternalism—the assumption that a child can only have one real mother—as an ideology that, like monogamy, marginalizes non-normative forms of intimacy and kinship. While adoptive families, queer families, and blended families embody sites of resistance to monomaternalist practices and policies, these non-normative family forms are also frequently recuperated into norms of monomaternalism by engaging dichotomies of nature/nurture and good/bad mothering that remain unchallenged in practices of "serial mothering." To effectively resist the pernicious consequences of monomaternalism we need to develop personal practices and institutional policies capable of recognizing multiple, simultaneous mother-child relations.

Pohlhaus, Gaile (Miami University) (Session Q)

"The Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice: Asymmetrical Relations in the Epistemic Economy"

In her book, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing*, Miranda Fricker posits a form of injustice that is distinctly epistemic. The concept of epistemic injustice as Fricker generally describes it has the potential to shed light on some of the ways in which knowledge

is thoroughly social. Yet some of the details in Fricker's account fall short of this potential. In this paper I first examine the notion of epistemic injustice in its general form provided in *Epistemic Injustice*, indicating some of the ways in which it implies that knowing is inherently social. I then turn to Fricker's account of testimonial injustice and epistemic objectification, which Fricker takes to be the primary harm of testimonial injustice. In contrast with Fricker, however, I argue that the primary harm in such cases is not only distinct from objectification, treating the epistemic agent as an object or instrument, but necessarily so. Understanding why this is the case shows that the primary wrong of testimonial injustice is better described using Ann Cahill's notion of derivatization. Derivatization not only describes the relation between the perpetrator and victim of testimonial injustice more accurately, it also reveals the structural and social aspects of knowing more clearly.

Roth, Amanda (University of Michigan) (Session C)

"Queering Reproductive Ethics"

In this paper, I argue for applying insights regarding epistemic privilege and the situatedness of knowledge to the case of reproductive ethics and the perspective of glbq people. As Cheshire Calhoun has convincingly argued, glbq people in the U.S. are "family outlaws" in the sense that dominant notions of marriage and parenthood exclude them and they are often thought to be inherently unfit for family life. I argue that given this fact about glbq existence, looking at issues in reproductive ethics from the perspective of glbq people might produce unique insights. To make clear the sort of insights I have in mind, I offer a case study of two issues in reproductive ethics in which little attention has been paid to glbq people: AID and surrogacy. I argue—with these cases in mind—that philosophical work on family and reproductive ethics which proceeds without considering the perspective of glbq people is likely to be philosophically inadequate.

Rule, Regan (Binghamton University) (Session K)

"Lived Friendship Is Non-ideal: A Critique of Code's Appropriation of Aristotle"

Lorraine Code has argued that we adopt Aristotle's conception of virtue friendship as a model for relational subjectivity in her 1991 book *What Can She Know?* Code sees Aristotelian friendship as a viable model not only for its epistemic and moral but also for its political potential. While I agree with her project, Code falls prone to a reductionist reading of Aristotle. Specifically she preferences his account of virtue-friendship over the lesser forms of friendship, such as friendships based on pleasure and utility and friendships between unequals. So long as one takes virtue-friendships as a model trust automatically inheres in such relationships as part of their definition. Because there exists no perfectly virtuous person, trust must be earned, not assumed. Code runs the risk of taking trust for granted without theorizing how that trust is developed. Aristotle's comments on the maintenance of unequal friendships are instructive and especially pertinent to feminist concerns about dependency and inequality.

Schueneman, Brooke (University of Georgia) (Session E)

"The New Anti-Immigration Discourse: Anchor Babies, Terror Babies, and Mujeres Latinas"

Georgia's Governor Nathan Deal and Congressman Phil Gingrey have identified a new threat facing Georgia and this nation. This threat comes in the craftiest of disguises. Small, innocent, and helpless, it hides in the last place you would think to look. It waits in a sanctuary, a place known for warmth, safety, nurturing, and growth. Suddenly it is time for the invasion, the "invasion by birth canal." According to Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, any person born in the United States is a citizen "of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This is commonly referred to as "birthright citizenship," and this amendment, say Deal and Gingrey, provides an unwarranted incentive for immigrants to enter the United States to have babies who can then sponsor their parents for citizenship. They call these babies "anchor babies." It is a loophole that is being exploited by the so-called illegal aliens. As a solution they suggest changing, or rather "clarifying," birthright citizenship so that this loophole no longer serves as a motivation for using a child to gain U.S. citizenship. In this paper I take a deeper look into the "anchor baby" discourse hoping to expose the underlying sexism and racism which inspires this abhorrent hate-speech aimed at Latina women

Szende, Jennifer (Queen's University) (Session K)

"Young and the Problem of Pseudo-Oppression"

Young's account of the concept of oppression starts from the use of the term 'oppression' by emancipatory social movements such as the civil rights movement. Yet, other groups, including groups on the far right, have adopted the language of an emancipatory social movement. This paper will argue that Young's account of oppression provides contradictory answers to the question of how to classify such uses of the term. The problem stems from Young's methodology, and in particular her starting point in the *use* of the term by emancipatory social movements. Inasmuch as white supremacist groups and others on the far right have adopted the framework of an emancipatory social movement, they gain legitimate use of the terms of the framework. The example reveals an underlying tension in Young's argument, and more generally in language-use arguments for political and emancipatory purposes.

Tessman, Lisa (Binghamton University) (Session O)

"On Having a Bottomless Source of Moral Failure"

My aim in this paper is to bring to light the experience of a particular kind of moral failure, namely the unavoidable moral failure that takes place when the vulnerabilities or dependencies of others generate an impossible moral requirement. That there is "inescapable moral wrongdoing"[1] has been recognized in the literature on moral dilemmas. I argue that there can be inevitable moral failures even outside of dilemmatic situations, and that these failures can be revealed within a "vulnerability model" of moral requirement. The vulnerability model, proposed by Robert Goodin and adapted into a feminist form by Eva Kittay, locates a source of moral requirements in vulnerability. I suggest a revised version of the vulnerability model that makes assumptions contrary to Kittay's: specifically, I propose a vulnerability model that 1) assumes that there is moral luck, and 2) assumes that there are genuine moral dilemmas, and furthermore that 3) rejects the principle that "ought implies

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[1] Borrowing from the title of Gowans (1994).

can" for vulnerability-responsive moral requirements.[2] Such a version of the vulnerability model reveals that inevitable moral failures can arise either 1) when moral requirements generated from vulnerability conflict with each other and cannot all/both be satisfied, and 2) when the basic needs of others are bottomless, such as in cases where a person is "unrepairable." Rather than assume that requirements to "protect the vulnerable"[3] or care for dependents are, like deontic moral requirements, limited to what is possible, I contend that *moral requirements arising from others' vulnerabilities are not bounded by the possibility of their fulfillment.*

Warriner, Jennifer (University of Utah) (Session K)

"Feminism and Political Liberalism: A Return to Comprehensive Liberalism?"

Is liberalism compatible with the feminist aim of ending gender oppression? Some feminist thinkers argue that only comprehensive liberalism provides a suitable normative framework to advance feminist aims. However, in her 2007 paper, "Pornography and Public Reason," Lori Watson argues that feminist thinkers ought to appeal to political liberalism to fight gender injustice. According to Watson, political liberalism not only has the resources to address gender injustice, political liberalism *requires* that gender injustice be addressed. This is because gender injustice in the private or social world interferes with the legitimacy of political deliberations between citizens in the political world, which in turn threatens the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. In this paper, I argue that if Watson's interpretation is correct, this pushes political liberalism in the direction of comprehensive liberalism. I argue that Watson's account of political liberalism is comprehensive liberalism in disguise: one that purports to describe a general theory for political justice and social relations and which commands citizens' allegiance over and above any other "private" beliefs they might hold. If I am right, my argument presents a consideration in favour of comprehensive liberalism, for it turns out that feminist critics were right – only comprehensive liberalism can deal with gender oppression.

Weir, Allison (University of Western Sydney) (Session D)

"Feminism and the Islamic Revival: Freedom as a Practice of Belonging"

In her book,*The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject,* Saba Mahmood analyzes the practices of the women in the mosque movement in Cairo, arguing that in order to recognize the participants as agents, we need to question the feminist assumption that agency entails resistance to norms. In this paper, I take up this question, to ask whether Mahmood's analysis of the agency of the pietists can contribute to a feminist reconceptualization of freedom. I argue that Mahmood is unable to address this question because of the limitations of the Foucauldian framework within which she locates the question of agency. While Mahmood draws on Foucault's late work on the ethics of the self to develop a finely nuanced analysis of the pietists' practices, her analysis exceeds the bounds of the Foucauldian paradigm, which is focused on the paradox of subjection through operations of power. What emerges in Mahmood's descriptions is, I argue, quite another understanding of agency, and of freedom: freedom as a practice of belonging.

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[2] Borrowing from Kittay's (1999) term, "vulnerability-responsive obligations."
[3] Borrowing from the title of Goodin (1985).

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